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ELEVENTH AMENDMENT FEDERALISM AND
STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY CASES:
DIRECT EFFECT ON SECTION 1983?
Steven H. Steinglass*
JUDGE PRATT:
Dean Steinglass is going to lead our next discussion, and lead off
with a discussion on Alden v. Maine.'
DEAN STEINGLASS:
I was asked to address briefly the impact of the Supreme Court's
recent Eleventh Amendment, federalism, and state sovereign
immunity decisions on Section 1983 litigation. These cases are
unlikely to have any direct or significant impact on Section 1983
litigation in the state or federal courts.' On the other hand, these
decisions will likely have a significant impact on non-Section 1983
litigation, including non-Section 1983 civil rights litigation. For
example, a few weeks ago the Supreme Court heard an argument
in an Age Discrimination and Education Act (hereinafter "ADEA")
case involving claims brought directly against the state.'
The recent Supreme Court cases to which I am referring are the
Tenth Amendment cases involving the Brady Amendment,' the
* Dean and Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. B.S., 1964,
University of Pennsylvania; LL.B., 1967, Columbia University School of Law.
1527 U.S. 706 (1999).
2 See id; Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings
Bank, 527 U.S. 666; Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); see
also U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State.
Id
3 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S.Ct. 631 (2000) In Kimel, the Court held
that "in the ADEA, Congress did not validly abrogate the States' sovereign
immunity to suits by private individuals. Id. at 650.
4 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)(holding that the Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act imposed unconstitutional obligations on state
officials); U.S. CONST. amend. X. This section provides: "The powers not
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Eleventh Amendment cases holding that Congress does not have
power under the Commerce Clause to abrogate the state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suit,5 and a decision striking down the
constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,6 and,
as Judge Pratt mentioned, Alden v. Maine!
Let me focus on Alden, which was not a Section 1983 case, but a
state court Fair Labor Standards Act case.' The plaintiffs, after
having been rebuffed in federal court on their claim for retroactive
wages, went into stae court where the Eleventh Amendment does
not apply.9 The United States Supreme Court went beyond the text
of the Eleventh Amendment and held that the doctrine of state
sovereign immunity predated the ratification of the Eleventh
Amendment and, therefore, limited the power of Congress acting
under the commerce clause to subject states to suit in their own
courts.' However, Alden creates a number of exceptions." The
doctrine the Court identifies in Alden does not apply to suits
against local government, suits brought on claims grounded in the
Fourteenth Amendment, nor suits for prospective injunctive
relief.2
The limitations on the scope of Section 1983 imposed by the
Eleventh Amendment and various federalism doctrines do not stem
from the recent group of cases, but rather from the decisions that
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Id.
5 Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); see also Kimel v.
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
6 See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that Congress
exceeded its constitutional power by enacting the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act).
7527 U.S. 706 (1999).
" Fair Labor and Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060, as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-219 (1998).
9 Alden, 527 U.S. at 712. The district court dismissed the case after the
Supreme Court's decision in Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996) made clear that "Congress lacks power under Article I to abrogate the
States' sovereign immunity from suits commenced or prosecuted in the federal
courts." Id.
'0 Id. at 713.
" See generally Steven H. Steinglass, Section 1983 Litigation in State Courts
112j (West Group).
'2 Alden, 527 U.S. at 756-57.
[Vol 16770
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the Supreme Court reached in the 1970's and the 1980's. These
decisions resurrected the Eleventh Amendment and construed the
word "person" in Section 1983 as not including states. 3 Thus for
almost three decades Section 1983 plaintiffs had no ability to
directly sue states or state officials under Section 1983. Therefore,
Alden really does not make much of a difference for Section 1983
litigation.
I have also been asked to address Howlett v. Rose," a decision in
which the Supreme Court held that Florida state courts could not
exclude Section 1983 cases against local governmental bodies
from their courts. 5 The Court further held in Howlett that the
states could not interpose a state law defense of sovereign
immunity that the state extended to local government.
6
In Howlett, the Court relied on a long line of cases, including
cases involving what is sometimes known as the "non-
discrimination principle."' 7  This principle proclaims that states
cannot discriminate against federal law when they decide how
widely they should open the doors to their courthouses. 8
13 See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (treating the Eleventh
Amendment as a bar to suits for retroactive relief for welfare benefits illegally
withheld); Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979)(holding that in enacting
Section 1983 Congress had not evidenced a clear intent to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment); Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (19S9)
(holding that neither the state nor a state official acting in his official capacity is
a "person"' for Section 1983 purposes).
14 496 U.S. 356 (1990).
15 Id. at 375. The Court concluded that, "whether the question is framed in
pre-emption terms... or in the obligation to assume jurisdiction over a 'federal'
cause of action, the Florida court's refusal to entertain one discrete category of §
1983 claims, when the court entertains similar state law actions against state
defendants, violates the Supremacy Clause." Id.
16 id.
17 Id. at 356. See, e.g., Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136-37 (1876);
Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377, 387 (1929). In Douglas,
the Court held that a state law relating to action against a foreign corporation by
a non-resident was unconstitutional. Id. at 377. The Court stated, "[S]uch a
court may not deny a federal right, when the parties and controversy are
properly before it, in the absence of a "valid excuse." Id.
iS Howlett, 496 U.S. at 356. See, e.g., Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R.
Co., 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912). The Mondou Court's holding that, "An excuse that
is inconsistent with or violates federal law is not a valid excuse: The Supremacy
Clause forbids state courts to dissociate themselves from federal law because of
2000
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Alden does not seem to be in direct conflict with Howlett. Alden
can be interpreted as simply holding that the Howlett principle, that
is, the duty of state courts to entertain Section 1983 and other
federally created causes of action, does not apply when the suit is
brought directly against the state. The Court in Alden noted, for
example, that the state of Maine regards immunity from suit as one
of the highest attributes inherent in the nature of sovereignty. 9
The Court went on to state that there is no evidence that Maine has
manipulated its immunity in a systematic fashion to discriminate
against federal causes of action.20 The simple fact that Maine has
chosen to consent to certain classes of suit, while maintaining its
immunity from others, is no more than the exercise of a privilege
of sovereignty. 2 Therefore, under Alden and Howlett, states are
still obligated to entertain Section 1983 cases, but they are not
obligated to do so when they are directly against the state. Since
the Supreme Court crossed that bridge almost three decades ago
and does not permit states to be sued under Section 1983, Alden
does not impose new limitations on Section 1983 litigation.
This conclusion about the limited impact of Alden on Section
1983 may overstate the case. Section 1983 is available not only to
enforce federal constitutional provisions rooted in the Fourteenth
Amendment but also constitutional claims under the Commerce
Clause' and federal statutory claims enacted under Commerce
Clause,' not Fourteenth Amendment authority. Therefore, there
may be important sub-groups of Section 1983 cases that do not fall
disagreement with its content or a refusal to recognize the superior authority of
its source." Id.
'9 Alden, 527 U.S. at 757.
20 Id. at 758. The Court stated, "[A]lthough petitioners contend the State has
discriminated against federal rights by claiming sovereign immunity from this
FLSA suit, there is no evidence that the State has manipulated its immunity in a
systematic fashion to discriminate against federal causes of action." Id.2 Id.
Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439 (1991)(holding that Commerce Clause
claims are cognizable under Section 1983).
23 See, e.g., Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103
(1989)(holding that National Labor Relations Act pre-emption claims can be
heard under Section 1983); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. l(1980)(holding that
the "and laws" language in Section 1983 makes the statute available to enforce
statutory claims).
[Vol 16
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within the Alden exceptions. -4 Moreover, Alden signals a direction
in which the Court appears to be heading. If the Court views state
sovereign immunity as a fundamental, though uncodified,
constitutional doctrine, one could imagine the Court revisiting
cases that have limited the scope of the Eleventh Amendment in
Section 1983 litigation.' For example, such a reexamination could
unravel Section 1983 litigation against local governmental entities
in both state and federal court.
Could another generation of federal cases start to extend the
Eleventh Amendment and other immunities to local government?
The answer is yes, but there is nothing in Alden that suggests the
Supreme Court is willing to take its concept of federalism and state
sovereign immunity that far.
24See supra note 12.
25See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 662, 646 (1980)(rejecting
the application of sovereign immunity to municipalities); Mt. Healthy City Sch.
Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977)(noting that the Eleventh
Amendment bar against suit applies to states and state officials, but not to
municipalities); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974)(holding that the
Eleventh Amendment does not protect a governor from an individual capacity
Section 1983 suit).
2000
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